原版文章由Adrian Zenz 和 James Leibold撰写，于2017年9月21日在《Jamestown Foundation》杂志上发表。中文版于匿名者翻译。
近几年，新疆维吾尔自治区党委书记陈全国为新设的九万以上警察及治安相关的岗位招聘，以至新疆的治安机关急剧扩大。【1】这位军人出身的政治家在国外鲜为人知，在中国国内已有更新民族政策的美誉，他为加强中国共产党对于位于中国西部的维族、藏族及其他少数民族的统治创造了一系列新方法。
Over the last year, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party Secretary Chen Quanguo (陈全国) has dramatically increased the police presence in Xinjiang by advertising over 90,000 new police and security-related positions. [1] This soldier-turned-politician is little known outside of China, but within China he has gained a reputation as an ethnic policy innovator, pioneering a range of new methods for securing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule over Uyghurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities in western China.
生于河南农村的一个贫困家庭，陈全国耐心地在共党的权利阶梯上攀爬。他最早在老家河南于现任总理李克强手下工作，之后晋升为河北省党委书记。2011年，他接管2008年暴力事件频发的西藏自治区，这是当时极为艰巨的任务。在藏五年间，他建立了精密的监视网络，成功恢复了自治区稳定。2016年8月，他被调任新疆，迅速展开同样的安全化，短短一年完成了西藏五年时间的工程。
Born into a poor family in rural Henan province, Chen worked his way up the CCP ladder, serving first under Premier Li Keqiang in his native Henan, before becoming Party Secretary of neighboring Hebei province. In 2011, he was handed the difficult task of ruling the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), which had once again erupted into violence in 2008. During his five years in Tibet, he restored stability through the construction a sophisticated network of surveillance and control. After being transferred to the XUAR in August 2016, he quickly rolled out the same securitization strategy, accomplishing in a single year what took him five years in the TAR.
先后在西藏、新疆两地，陈全国借用了帝国战略，模仿历史上的殖民势力（例如英国和日本）征募当地人以监督自己的民族。在中国，少数民族长期以来不被排斥在共产党之外，然而，陈全国为治安机关所招聘的维吾尔族人与藏人人数远远超越了过去十年的招聘总数额，很可能是一个新的历史数字。
In Tibet and now Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo lifted a strategy directly from the imperial playbook, with past colonial powers like England and Japan enlisting ”native” populations to watch over their own people. Ethnic minorities have long served the CCP in China. However, the numbers of Uyghurs and Tibetans that have been recruited into China’s security apparatus under Chen far exceed public recruitments during the preceding decade and are potentially setting a historic record.
陈全国的治边稳藏策略
Chen Quanguo’s Policing Strategy in Tibet
在西藏自治区上任的两个月内，陈全国于2011年8月推出了“便民警务站”，在街角为社区性安防工作竖起岗亭。2011年10月，西藏自治区为2500个安防岗位招聘，其中458个要分配到拉萨新设的便民警务站 (Xueyu 教育, 2011年10月21日）。截至2012年8月，拉萨修建了161个混凝土结构的岗亭，间距不超过500米。
Within two months of assuming power in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in August 2011, Chen Quanguo rolled out his first and perhaps most effective security innovation, the so-called convenience police stations (便民警务站), street-corner bulwarks for community-based policing. In October 2011, the TAR advertised 2,500 police positions, with 458 of them designated for Lhasa’s new convenience police stations (Xueyu jiaoyu, October 21, 2011). By August 2012, Lhasa had established 161 of these concrete structures with a distance of no more than 500 meters between stations (Ministry of Public Security, August 12, 2012).
这个密集的监视网络即是共产党官员所称的“社会网格化管理”的核心，这个策略通过将一座城市划分为很多个几何区域，安防人员可以凭借新兴科技去系统性地观察和监视一定范围内的所有行动。此系统结合大数据分析、闭路电视摄像机网络和公安机关数据库，实现高强度甚至全自动化的监视。网格化管理于2004年在北京第一次试点(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, October 28, 2013)，而陈全国在中国西部所建立的系统大概是迄今为止最全面最先进的范例。
This dense network of surveillance is at the heart of what Party officials call “grid-style social management” (社会网格化管理), a practice that segments urban communities into geometric zones so that security staff can systematically observe all activities with the aid of new technologies (ChinaChange, August 8, 2013; China Brief, August 17). The system relies on big data analytics, connecting a network of CCTV cameras with police databases to achieve enhanced, even automated surveillance. Grid management was first trialed in Beijing in 2004 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, October 28, 2013). Chen’s implementation of the convenience police station network in China’s West is probably the most sophisticated implementation yet.
截至2016年，西藏已经建成了700多所便民警务站，遍布于所有城市化与半城市化的中心地区(News.163.com, March 4, 2016)。为了给这些警务站配备职工，地方政府急剧增加治安岗位招聘。从2007年到2011年夏季，西藏自治区登广告招聘了多于2830个各种各样的安防岗位。2008年到2009年的平均年度招聘率为866，跟2007年拉萨暴乱前的260相比已有明显增长。陈全国上任后，招聘数额进一步暴涨。从2011年秋季到2016年，西藏自治区登广告招聘了12313为与安防相关的岗位，即前五年的招聘总数额的四倍。
By 2016, the TAR had established over 700 of these stations throughout all urban and semi-urban centers (News.163.com, March 4, 2016). In order to man them, regional authorities dramatically increased security recruitment. Between 2007 and the summer of 2011, the TAR advertised 2,830 positions for all types of police officers. Between 2008–2009, annual police recruitment averaged 866 positions, already a steep increase over the 260 positions advertised in 2007 before the Lhasa riots. However, after Chen Quanguo assumed office, recruitment skyrocketed. Between the autumn of 2011 and 2016, the TAR advertised 12,313 policing-related positions—over four times as many positions as the preceding five years.
陈全国在疆展开的安全化策略
Chen Quanguo Applies His Security Strategy to Xinjiang
在陈全国任西藏党委书记的五年中没有发生大规模事件，在这五年间的150起自焚案件中，只有8起发生在西藏自治区，而2012年后报道里不再出现任何自焚或者社会动荡事件。(International Campaign for Tibet, [accessed August 30]) 对陈全国的表现，中文媒体纷纷赞扬，报道指出：“西藏社会保持了稳定，见诸报道的几无大的稳定事件，只在周边省份藏区出现过”(Phoenix Information, August 29, 2016).
During Chen Quanguo’s five-year rule in Tibet, this previously restive minority region experienced no major incidents of unrest. Only eight of the 150 self-immolation incidents (a form of protest) occurred in the TAR, with no self-immolations or other incidents of major social unrest reported in the region after 2012 (International Campaign for Tibet, [accessed August 30]). Chen’s performance was praised in the Chinese language media, with one report noting that “TAR society maintained stability, with no major reported incidents of unrest, whereas [such incidents] did occur in the surrounding Tibetan regions” (Phoenix Information, August 29, 2016).
陈全国在西藏的铁腕维稳政策受到了北京的关注和认可。当习近平想替换新疆的前任党委书记张春贤时，陈全国作为能干和可靠的政治盟友浮出水面 (Aboluowang, April 18, 2014)。通过在处理复杂民族事务上的成就，且作为最早一批支持“习核心” 的高层官员，他很可能会在第十九次全国代表大会被晋升为政治局委员。(Wenxuecheng, August 31, 2016)
Chen’s firm grip on stability in Tibet did not go unnoticed in Beijing. While there was talk of replacing former XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian with a close ally of Xi Jinping, Chen Quanguo emerged as a capable and politically reliable candidate in 2016 (Aboluowang, April 18, 2014). By proving himself with a difficult ethnic portfolio and being one of the first senior Party officials to speak of Xi Jinping as “core” of the Party leadership, Chen gained Xi’s confidence (Wenxuecheng, August 31, 2016). He will likely be rewarded with a seat on the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress.
陈全国上任时，新疆的维稳问题对北京来说比西藏更为严峻。2009年乌鲁木齐7·5事件后，前任党委书记已经开始扩大安防人员的招募。从2003年到2008年，从广告上看，新疆招募了5800人，2009到2016年，这个数目暴涨到接近40000。。年度安防公告的平均招聘职位从1000上升到5000。如我们之前细节更充分的文章所指出的，为减少成本，招募采取临时聘用制度，创造更多的以协警和辅警为主的低层安防岗位。这些岗位和人民警与特警相比，装备更差、工资低、训练少。
At the time of Chen’s new appointment, Xinjiang represented a far greater security concern for Beijing than the TAR. Under his predecessors, Xinjiang had already considerably ramped up the recruitment of police and other security officers in response to the 5 July 2009 riots in Urumqi. Between 2003–2008, Xinjiang advertised about 5,800 such positions, yet these intakes multiplied to nearly 40,000 between 2009 and July 2016. On average, police adverts increased from just below 1,000 to nearly 5,000 positions per year. As described in more detail in our previous article, this recruitment drive relied increasingly on contract-based positions outside the formal civil service system (China Brief, March 14). This strategy enabled a cost-efficient expansion of the police force. It leveraged the limited manpower of formal and better-equipped regular police (人民警察) and special police units (特警) through the establishment of a new underclass of poorly-trained and (traditionally) lower-paid assistant police (协警 or 辅警).
2016年8月到2017年7月，陈全国将多层维稳制度的逻辑推至高潮。在这一年里，招聘公告中出现了90866个与维稳相关的职位——这个数额接近2009年七五事件发生后的十二倍。绝大部分职位（95%）是要配备到新疆各地新设的7500所便民服务站的协警和辅警(Energy News, January 12). [2] 根据大小不同，一所警务站平均需要6至30人值勤，而目前的招聘数额仅为一站12人，这或许意味着这片招聘浪潮将延续到明年(Zhongguo xiaofang Zaixian, January 16, 2017; Zhonggong jiaoyu, May 9)。
Between August 2016 and July 2017, Chen Quanguo pushed this multi-tiered policing system to its logical conclusion. Within the space of a single year, Xinjiang advertised 90,866 security-related positions—nearly twelve times the number advertised in 2009 following the Urumqi riots. The vast majority of these jobs (95 percent) were assistant police positions associated with the establishment of an estimated 7,500 convenience police stations across Xinjiang (Energy News, January 12). [2] Depending on their size, convenience police stations have a staffing quota of six to thirty security personnel, while current advertised recruitments stand at around 12 assistant police per station. This suggests that Chen’s recruitment drive will likely continue into next year (Zhongguo xiaofang Zaixian, January 16, 2017; Zhonggong jiaoyu, May 9). [3]
图1. （新疆维吾尔族自治区政府招聘公告。“监视”指不同网络和视频监控相关的岗位。正式警务工作包含法庭、司法、监狱等机关的与安防相关的职位。
Figure 1. Source: XUAR civil service, public service, and other public job announcements. “Surveillance” pertains to various positions related to internet and video surveillance systems. Formal police positions also include security-related civil service positions in the court, justice and prison systems.
疆藏治安扩展的比较分析
Comparing Chen’s Security Buildup in Xinjiang and Tibet
新疆的人口2015年计为2320万人，比西藏的人口大七倍，因而新疆的新招员工和新建警务站更多也不出所料。
How do these astonishing figures in Xinjiang compare to the TAR? The larger recruitment and police station figures for Xinjiang are not surprising, considering that the XUAR’s population in 2015 stood at 23.2 million, more than seven times the TAR’s 3.2 million.
新疆也是北京目前的主要国内安全问题。首先，对于中共来说，维吾尔族团体的暴力抵抗与伊斯兰极端主义被视为安全威胁，比西藏社会动荡更为迫切。其次，新疆处于通向中亚南亚等地的贸易投资的策略关塞，其稳定是“一带一路”之成败的关键，因而被重视为“核心区”。
Xinjiang is also Beijing’s top domestic security concern at present. First, Uyghur resistance and fear of ”Islamic extremism” are now viewed as a far greater threat to CCP rule than Tibetan unrest. Second, stability in Xinjiang is crucial to the success of Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road (一带一路) initiative, with Xinjiang reemerging as a “core region” (核心区) and strategic crossroad for trade and investment opportunities in Central and South Asia, as well as Europe and the Middle East (Xinhua, June 4, 2015).
两区可用的数据表明，新疆目前的人均警务站数额为每十万人323所，高于西藏的每十万人216所。另一方面，西藏的人均安防员工招聘率为十万人400个，高于新疆的394个。然而，新疆的维稳还在展开，很可能在今年的9月份就会超过西藏达到的程度。可是，据说短期内的高招聘率导致新员工越来越难招。
When comparing figures for the two regions per capita, the available data indicates that the XUAR might now have considerably more convenience police stations per capita than the TAR: 323 versus the TAR’s 216 per 100,000 of the population. On the other hand, the TAR advertised 400 policing-related positions per 100,000 of its population during Chen Quanguo’s rule there, while Xinjiang advertised 394 such positions. [4] Yet the security build-up in Xinjiang is continuing, and likely to surpass the level achieved in the TAR as early as September this year. That said, the sheer number of positions advertised in the XUAR during such a short period of time is apparently making it increasingly difficult to attract new applicants. [5]
藏区的维稳事件自2008年以来几乎仅限于自我伤害，且数量稀少。而维吾尔武装分子自2009年以来已向派出所等公共空间进行了一系列致命袭击，造成几千人死亡。新疆几次大规模的恐怖袭击，如2013年10月份在北京的自杀性汽车爆炸袭击及2014年3月的昆明火车站的持刀袭击，严重加深了社会恐惧，促使中央政府加强铁腕态度。
Unrest in Tibetan regions has been much more sporadic since 2008, with most acts being limited to self-harm. Uyghur militants, on the other hand, have carried out a string of deadly attacks on local police stations and other public settings that have resulted in thousands of deaths since 2009. Most notably, a series of high-profile terror attacks outside the XUAR, including a suicide car bombing in Beijing (October 2013) and the train station stabbing in Kunming (March 2014) seriously unnerved the Chinese populace and prompted the central government to take an even tougher stance.
2014年4月乌鲁木齐街市爆炸袭击导致43人死亡，90余人受伤，之后，习近平发起了一个全国反恐运动。时任新疆党委书记张春贤呼吁“打好人民反恐战争”，习近平号召建立“铁壁铜墙”（人民日报2014年05月26日；新华社2014年05月29日）。同时，“一带一路”的陆地路线须以新疆为主要交通枢纽，安全问题显得更为重要。
After the April 2014 Urumqi market bombing, which left 43 dead and over 90 injured, Xi Jinping announced a nationwide counter-terrorism campaign. Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian called for a “people’s war on terror”, while Xi spoke of the need to build “walls made of copper and steel” (People’s Daily, May 26, 2014; Xinhua, May 29, 2014). The concurring rise of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, whose land route relies on Xinjiang as the primary traffic hub, further elevated the importance of the region’s security.
从招聘广告看，2014、2015两年的招聘律迅速地上升，比起七五事件后的年度平均招聘率高三四倍。即使如此，由图（2）可见，比起2016年后陈全国的巨额扩招，张春贤“人民战争”的招聘增长率并不高。
In response, advertised police recruitments in 2014 and 2015 increased rapidly in Xinjiang. They significantly exceeded the per capita count of the 2009 intake following the Urumqi riots, being three to four times as high as in 2007-08, 2010-11 or 2013. However, as Figure 2 reveals, this build up for Zhang’s ‘war on terror’ was actually quite minor when compared to the massive increase in advertised policing positions under Chen Quanguo (2016/17).
图2.人口数据为2012年。（西藏/新疆统计年鉴）
Figure 2. Population figures are from 2012 (sources: TAR/XUAR Statistical Yearbooks).
表面上看，陈全国的维稳策略效果卓著。和西藏一样，自从便民警务站网络建立，几无民族动荡或暴力事件发生，近期最后一桩是2015年9月发生在南疆一家煤矿的凶杀案，造成50人死亡，其后的几次都是持刀袭击小案，似乎不为蓄意。皮山县2017年2月发生刀捅事件时，警务站的迅速反应得到了媒体的赞扬，五人被杀，五名袭击者被击毙。（新浪，2017年2月22日）由于新闻报道受限，难以做出可靠的事件统计，但是大规模事件不太可能被完全掩盖。
On the surface, Chen Quanguo’s strategy seems to be producing results. As in Tibet, there have been no major incidents of ethnic unrest or violence since the establishment of the convenience police stations, with the last major incident occurring in September 2015 when a stabbing at a coal mine in southern Xinjiang left 50 dead. Since then, there have only been comparatively minor and apparently unpremeditated knife attacks. In fact, the XUAR’s new network of convenience police stations were praised for the quick response to a stabbing in Pishan County in February 2017, despite the fact that five innocent bystanders were killed before armed police shot dead three assailants (Sina, February 22). While limits on reporting from the region preclude any reliable statistical accounts of incidents in Xinjiang, it seems less-than-likely that any major incident would go completely unnoticed.
安全化作为就业策略
Securitization as Employment Strategy
陈全国的安全化策略同时达到了两个维稳目的，除了建立密集的警察监视网之外，它还提供了许多新的就业机会，在新疆薪水较高的稳定工作仍然比较稀缺。我们对于招聘文件的分析表明，陈全国的扩招政策使相当多藏人受益。根据可用数据，我们估计从2012年到2016年约77%的受雇或者接近受雇的人是藏族。【8】虽然这比例低于藏族在西藏人口所占的90.5%，但它高于西藏高校毕业生的比例（公务员必须至少是本科毕业生）。
Chen Quanguo’s securitization strategy achieves two stability maintenance (维稳) goals at the same time: the construction of a dense network of police surveillance, and a range of new employment opportunities in a region where stable, well-remunerated jobs are still relatively scarce. Our analyses of recruitment documents indicate that Tibetans have benefited significantly from Chen’s job bonanza. Based on the available data, we estimate that between 2012 and 2016 about 77 percent of applicants who either obtained or were close to obtaining a government job were Tibetan. [8] While this share is lower than the overall Tibetan population share of 90.5 percent, it exceeds the share of Tibetans among all TAR university graduates (only tertiary graduates are eligible to apply for formal government jobs). [9]
虽然陈全国没有在新疆重复对西藏的充分就业的承诺，但和安全相关的工作已经成为了主要的新工作岗位来源。“城镇非私营单位”，即公共部门和大型企业的稳定高薪工作的增长率，到2014和2015年明显放慢。【10】去除公共单位的话，统计表明新疆的私营就业率几乎停滞，而且制造、采矿、建造以及交通等关键行业还出现了就业紧缩，很有可能是过度的安全措施导致的消极副作用。一位本地商人告诉我们，陈全国的安全措施导致不少公司破产，包括在较为富裕的北疆，结果很多投资人决定撤资，有资格的员工也在离开新疆。官方数据反映了这新趋势，2016年新疆的私人固定自资产投资急剧逆转锐减22%即一千亿人民币，而前几年一直在两位数的超过全国平均值的增长率2014年同样减少了1.4%，2015年只涨了微乎其微的1%，如今已远远低于国家平均增长率。
Even though Chen has not replicated the full employment promise in Xinjiang, security-related work is now the single most important source of new jobs. Growth in “urban non-private units,” a technical term that refers to stable, well-remunerated posts in a) public institutions and b) larger private corporations, slowed down considerably in 2014 and 2015 compared to previous years. [10] Excluding employment in public institutions, Xinjiang’s private corporate sector by itself virtually stagnated during that period. Key sectors such as manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation actually saw a reduction in employment. This is likely a negative side effect of the region’s exorbitant new security measures. A local businessman told us that Chen’s security measures have resulted in numerous businesses going bankrupt, even in the wealthier north. As a consequence, investors are said to be withdrawing their capital, and qualified employees are leaving the region. Official data reflects this trend. In 2016, XUAR fixed-asset investment from private investors fell by 22 percent or nearly 100 billion RMB, a sharp reversal compared to several years of double-digit growth. After years of double-digit growth that trumped the national average, Xinjiang’s per capita GDP declined by 1.4 percent in 2015 and only grew by a tiny 1 percent in 2016, now far below the national figures. [11]
在危于累卵的情况下，陈全国的警察扩招政策完全能够弥补了其他行业的就业停滞。陈全国上任第一年，2014年到2015年，新疆的私营经济新增就业岗位仅38000个【12】，甚至不到广告上91000个安防相关的新就业机会的一半。通常来说，低端安防岗位的薪水比私营企业低很多，但是在新疆，薪水在显著上升。到2017年，平均薪水已经达到了4700元/月，仅比和同地区在公共部门和私有企业就业的平均薪水5836元差13%。如今，协警和辅警的月薪已超过了非企业的私营部门的平均工资，在新疆是3133元，全国3300元（2015年）。除此之外，这些岗位现已享受“五险”（对养老保险、医疗保险、失业保险、工伤保险和生育保险）。在目前的政治环境里，这些合同制岗位看起来非常稳定。2017年，有27%的合同制岗位享有与政府公务员相同的薪水和福利，有些新招员工在两三年后被允许报考正式的人民警察。
In this precarious situation, Chen’s security recruitment drive is more than compensating for the employment trough in other sectors. Between 2014 and 2015, Xinjiang’s entire private corporate employment sector added only 38,000 jobs. [12] This is less than half the nearly 91,000 security-related positions advertised during Chen’s first year in Xinjiang. While lower-tier security jobs typically pay much lower salaries than corporate private sector work, their pay levels are increasing significantly in Xinjiang. In 2017, they averaged around 4,700 RMB/month, only 13 percent below the region’s average public institutional and corporate private sector wage level of 5,386 RMB/month (2016). These assistant police jobs now pay substantially more than the average non-corporate private sector wage of 3,133 RMB/month for Xinjiang and 3,300 RMB/month for China (both 2015). [13] Furthermore, they now come with a standard set of social benefits, the so-called “five insurances” (五险) of age, medical, unemployment, injury and maternity insurance. And in the current political environment, these contract-based positions are likely very secure. In 2017, 27 percent of them even offered salaries and benefits commensurate with formal government employment, with others permitting recruits to apply for entry into the formal police service after two or three years.
和西藏一样，大部分新增岗位是由新疆的少数民族（包括维族）应聘，与公务员（或大公司员工）须是大学毕业不同，协警和辅警通常只需中学毕业。对大多数处于弱势、不具有教育机会的农村少数民族，尤其是维族人来说，附带一定权威和社会地位，3-6千元月薪的非正式警察的工作颇有吸引力。同时，这种边缘化人群恰恰是构成最大安全风险的人口。 陈全国给成千上万的贫困维族人工作岗位和丰厚工资，让他们监视自己民族同胞，真可谓一石二鸟【14】。
As in the TAR, Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities (including Uyghurs) have been able to secure a large proportion of these new security positions. Whereas formal government (or corporate private sector) employment mandates that applicants must hold a university degree, assistant police positions usually require only a middle or high school education. For the large number of lesser-educated and socially disadvantaged rural minorities, especially the Uyghurs, an informal policing job that pays 3,000-6,000 RMB per month is an attractive offer, especially when it comes with a level of social status and authority. At the same time, this marginalized population is precisely the one that poses the greatest security risk. Chen’s strategy of paying generous salaries to thousands of impoverished Uyghurs to get them to monitor their own people, therefore, kills two birds with the same stone. [14]
结论：陈全国的安全化计划能否成功？
Conclusion: Will Chen Quanguo’s Securitization Approach be Successful?
即使陈全国的策略在短期内成效显著，但长期以来至少会产生三方面的重大风险：
Despite its short-term successes, Chen Quanguo’s policing strategy bears at least three major risks:
１）经济上。“ 安全化”加重了新疆社会的经济负担，劳动自由流动受到严厉的限制，新疆各地的维族人被迫返回户口所在地，而这通常是几无工作机会的农村。在乌鲁木齐，维族行商一律被迫停业，而南疆居民没有书面许可是无法去附近的农村探亲。检查站如雨后春笋般地涌现，交通时间几乎翻倍了，使营商成本膨胀。严谨的安全规定加重了企业的经济负担，它们必须设安检门或者X光安检机、购买监视器、报警器、防暴们等设备、甚至聘请保安员工。同时，国家以“援疆政策”形式从上而下灌注的巨额投资，因无顾客需求而没得到回报。
The first risk is economic. The intense securitization of Xinjiang society has placed major burdens on its economy. Chen introduced measures that severely restrict the free flow of labor. Uyghurs across Xinjiang are being forced to return to their home regions, typically rural areas with very few viable sources of employment. In Urumqi, itinerant Uyghur shops and businesses are systematically being shut down. In southern Xinjiang, people cannot even visit a relative in a nearby village without obtaining a written permit. Mushrooming numbers of checkpoints have nearly doubled travel times, increasing the cost of doing business. Businesses are additionally burdened by heavy security requirements, such as installing metal detectors or even airport-style X-ray scanners at entrances, procuring monitoring equipment, alarms, riot-proof doors, or having to hire private security guards. Meanwhile, the state’s massive top-down investments, facilitated through the “pairing assistance” (援疆) program, likewise lack customers, both stemming from intense security measures and a failure to cater for what people actually need (South China Morning Post, September 4). [15]
2）铁腕统治激化民族关系。虽然暴力事件几乎不再发生，但表面下的怨恨在酝酿。可以用来制造炸弹的白糖现在被限购，刀和其他锋利工具上印二维码，这些极端措施无法取代一种真正的长期解决方案。现在的新疆，民族之间的信任和团结严重短缺。
The second risk is that heavy-handed securitization exacerbates ethnic tensions. Despite the absence of major incidents, hatred and resentment continues to simmer below the surface. Extreme measures such as restricting the sale of sugar per household to prevent bomb making or placing traceable serial numbers on knives and sharp metal tools cannot possibly replace a genuine long-term solution for sustainable ethnic relations. Inter-ethnic trust and cohesion are in short supply in Xinjiang.
３）第三种风险也是最容易被忽略的一种，当地汉族人口对政府的失信和疏远。我们的受访者认为汉族和维族同样痛恨陈全国。一位第三代北疆汉人表示，连维族较少的更发达地区也受到了无所不在的安全措施的影响，为了能够离开新疆，他们急于迁移户口，甚至想移民海外。2016年新疆的住宅地产投资陡降，尤其是汉族占大多数的北疆城市，如乌鲁木齐（-15%）和克拉玛依（-22%）。【16】另一个信源引用了汉族朋友的一句话：“维族人终于有了英雄——陈全国要把所有汉族赶走了。”
The third, and most easily overlooked risk is the alienation of the local Han population. Those we interviewed claim that Chen Quanguo is disliked—even hated—by both the Han and Uyghur population. A third-generation ethnic Han interviewee from northern Xinjiang stated that even Han from more developed regions with fewer Uyghurs are so deeply affected by the omnipresent security measures that they are desperate to leave, with many seeking to move their residence status to another province, or even emigrate overseas. In fact, XUAR residential property investment declined sharply in 2016, especially in the Han-dominated cities of Urumqi and Karamay, where it fell by 15 and 22 percent respectively. [16] Another source cited a Han friend as saying: “With Chen, the Uyghurs at last have a hero, because he is driving the Han away [from Xinjiang].”
虽然陈全国目前可能成功地镇压了维族反抗，但巨大的人力与经济成本证明其不可长期持续。
Chen Quanguo may have succeeded in squashing Uyghur resistance for now, but the human and economist costs might prove unsustainable in the long run.