Jump to: Minzu • Stability • Development
I. Minzu 民族
Minzu (ethnicity) is one of the most important terms to understand ethnic politics in China. The term is hard to translate because it describes what westerners generally call ethnic groups or races. In China minzu means ethnicity but not race. Party policy in Xinjiang is based on these ideas of minzu/ethnicity.
In the early 20th century, when the empire transformed to a nation-state, Chinese nation-builders borrowed the term minzu from Japanese minzoku to name the vast diverse population. The imagined nation was named zhonghua minzu (中华民族) to fit the state name zhonghua minguo (中华民国) in republic era, as the founding father Sun Yat-Sen called for a “union of five races” (wuzu 五族) which refers to Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Han, and Manchu). This idea of minzu drew from western notions of biological race. Communist china inherited the concept minzu and launched a nationality identification (minzu shibie 民族识别) project in the 1950s. however, the communists followed the Stalinist definition of nationality that is based on culture, language, and shared history but not biological ideas of race. This resulted in the recognition of 56 minzu in china, with Han being the majority and other 55 groups defined as minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu 少数民族). in public discourse however, minzu has gradually become a term to denote only the minority nationalities, as han-ness becomes the default of being Chinese nationals.
This bibliography shows another historical shift in china’s ethnic policy that known as “the second generation minzu policy,” which is pioneered by Beijing University sociology professor Ma Rong, and state theoreticians Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe. This new policy has steered away from the first generation minzu policies that focused on “unified polyethnic national configuration” (多元一体化格局). The key ideas of the second generation theory include depoliticizing minzu that are entitled to land rights and self-determination, focusing on ethnic mingling (jiaorong 交融), and prioritizing Mandarin Chinese as the national language (guoyu 国语) to forge a shared national identity in ethnic minority regions. these ideas are behind many of the state policies in Xinjiang today.
Keywords: 民族工作 minzu work, 民族融合 ethnic integration, 第二代民族政策 the second generation minzu policy, 去政治化 depoliticization, 国语教育 ‘national language’ education
Hao Shiyuan 郝时远, 2018All Ethnic Groups Embrace Together Like the Pomegranate Seeds
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Ma Rong 马戎, 2013Further Discussion on Our Nation’s Minzu Issue: Second Generation Minzu Policy
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Liu Ling 刘玲, 2012A Summary of China’s Association of Anthropological and Ethnological Science Seminar. ‘Adhere to the Basic Political System and Solve Issue in Development’
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Hu Lianhe 胡联合 and Hu An’gang 胡鞍钢, 2011How the Nationalities Question is Handled Outside of China
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II. Stability 稳定
Stability (wending 稳定) is a recurring and crucial term in Chinese official discourse. It means not only social peace and social security, but the absence of dissent, protests, or criticism of the government. This bibliography offers examples of Chinese ethnologists and legal scholars providing theoretical rationals and policy recommendations for mass surveillance, incarceration, and penalties, all in the name of stability.
“Security” is reiterated by government voices as imperative to ensure economic growth and social harmony. Whether it be a unified front of the Politburo in spite of internal conflict or the top-down “Strike-Hard Campaign” (see Glossary) in Xinjiang, stability is an end in itself. Since the Tiananmen incident broke out in Beijing in 1989, the Communist Party of China has asserted itself as the sole provider of socio-economic stability and safety of the masses from the boogeyman of potential “instabilities”, which are often vaguely framed to be foreign forces, ethnic separatism, and terrorism. As such, desires for greater autonomy, academic and press freedom, and political dissent are anathema to those in power who must maintain stability at all costs.
Stability has been one of the foundational state policies in Xinjiang. Since social unrests broke out in the late 1990s in Uyghur regions, former Party secretary Wang Lequan’s slogan “Stability overrides everything” (wending yadao yiqie稳定压倒一切) has been the guiding principle held by various levels of government offices in Xinjiang. The current Party secretary Chen Quanguo’s rallying cry “Without stability, everything is lost” (没有稳定一切皆为零) carried forth such ideology. On the eve of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in October 2017, Xinjiang became engulfed in unprecedented and ubiquitous surveillance and suppression. Chen applied advanced AI technology to build a provincial police state, including a DNA database, big data analytics, phone scanning software, face-recognition technologies, and much more.
Keywords: 维稳 maintain stability, 反恐怖主义 counterterrorism, 去极端化 deradicalization, 社区网格化管理 community grid style management, 境外势力 foreign forces
Shu Hongshui 舒洪水, 2018On the Necessity and Systematic Construction of Life Imprisonment: From the Perspective of Terrorism, Extremism Criminal Prevention
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Ma Dazheng 马大正, 2018Probe Into the Struggle of De-Extremalization in Xinjiang
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Pan Zhiping 潘志平, 2018Correctly Understand ‘National Self-Determination’ and ‘High Degree of Autonomy’
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Shu Hongshui 舒洪水 and Mao Zhengdong 毛振东, 2017Cooperation in Anti-Terrorism with Neighboring Countries—Using the Shanghai Cooperative Team’s Perspective
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Chen Mengyuan 陈梦媛, 2017Construction on the Optimization of Grid-based Management System in Xinjiang
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Ji Yantao 姬艳涛 and Wei Yin 尹伟, 2016The Theory and Practice of Anti-Terrorism Community Policing
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Li Zhe 立哲, 2016From the Perspective of Social Stability: Research on the Prevention and Control of Key Population in Xinjiang’s Rural Areas
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Wang Ding 王定 and Shan Dan 山丹, 2016Studies on Anti-Terrorism and the Xinjiang Mode
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Xu Jianying 许建英, 2016Review in History and Current Situation of ‘East Turkistan’ Issue
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Shu Hongshui 舒洪水 and Gou Zhen 苟震, 2015Regarding and Perfecting the Boundaries of Criminal Punishment on Religious Extremist Activities—A Comparison between the ‘Anti-Terror Law (Draft)’ and ‘The Criminal Law Amendment (No. 9)’
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Jia Yu 贾宇, 2015The Current Anti-Terror Criminal Measures in Xinjiang
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Shu Hongshui 舒洪水, 2015A Study on Anti-Terrorism Laws in the Xinjiang Region
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Yang Weiwei 杨薇薇, 2015Operational Research on Restraining the Infiltration of Religious Extremist Thought
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Lu Peng 芦鹏 and Cao Xuefei 曹雪飞, 2014An Analysis on Israel’s War on Terror and Its Implications for China’s War on Terror in Xinjiang— Using the Decision-Making Mechanism of the “National Security Commission” as the Focus
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Zhu Weiqun 朱维群, 2012Thoughts on Current Issues of Ethnic Minority Regions
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Song Hongbin 宋红彬 and Zhang Kun 张昆, 2011On Flow Population Service and Management Against the Background of Anti-Terrorism in Xinjiang
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III. Development 发展
Development (fazhan发展 ) is a core goal of the Chinese government and the Communist Party. It means economic development but also cultural, scientific, and military development. In addition to the goal of a prosperous and cultured life—“The Chinese Dream”—the party also promises “the rejuvenation of the Chinese minzu” which includes China’s return to great power status in the world.
While China has always conceived itself as a great power, its material backwardness during the Century of Humiliation forced it to reckon with its identity. Since the economic liberalization during the Deng Xiaoping years, China has experienced nothing short of a miracle in economic development and industrialization. The notion of a “moderately prosperous society” (小康社会) epitomizes this notion of economic development and modernization. As rising powers do vis-à-vis the hegemon, China seeks to renegotiate its sphere of influence and the Belt and Road Initiative is the redoubling of this effort. In total, China has already invested over $200 billion in the BRI and the scope of the project extends beyond 2027 and spreads over 125 countries.
Xinjiang is physically located in the epicenter of the BRI and is culturally distinct from the Han-dominated imagination of a new China. The current academic discourse in China is already framing Xinjiang’s location as “strategic,” “essential” and “core.” This discourse is developed in conjunction with state policies such as “Xinjiang Aid” (援疆) and a plethora of other economic development projects that aim to integrate Xinjiang fully into a rising China. This is a source of ongoing friction and conflict as locals resent central government impositions and Beijing sees local resistance as irrational and dangerous opposition to development. As such, just how this “new Silk Road” will be paved over Xinjiang is something that should interest every keen observer.
Keywords: 扶贫 Poverty alleviation, 一带一路 Belt and Road Initiative, 就业 employment, 援疆 Xinjiang Aid
Yi Jianping 易建平, 2018A Study on Man-land Relations and Development Strategies of Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang
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Feng Jianyong 冯建勇, 2016New Vision for China’s Borderland Study of “One Belt and One Road”
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Qiu Yuanyuan 邱媛媛, 2016Persist in Shared Development and Promote the Construction of the People’s Livelihood in Southern Xinjiang
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Xu Jianying 许建英, 2015Xinjiang’s Position and Core-Zone Construction in Perspective of “Silk-Road Economic Belt”
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Ilham Tohti 伊力哈木·土赫提, 2014Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and Recommendations
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Xing Guangcheng 邢广程, 2014On China’s New Silk Road Strategy: A New Linking Model of Deep Interactions between China and the World
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Wu Lili 武丽丽, 2013An Analysis of the Current Situation of the Legal Consciousness of Xinjiang’s Transient Ethnic Minority Population
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Baihatiyar Tursun 拜合提亚尔·吐尔逊, 2003
The Existing Problems and their Countermeasures during the Course of Social and Economic Development in Southern Xinjiang
新疆南疆地区社会经济发展面临的问题、对策及其意义———新疆维吾尔自治区南疆地区实地调查
Baihatiyar Tursun draws on field work in southern Xinjiang to assess the province’s economic problems and propose solutions for its development. His solution includes five steps: state investment in development and construction, the revitalization of the region’s natural environment to better exploit its resources, the improvement of transportation and communication infrastructure, the promotion of education and scientific knowledge as an antidote to the “religious consciousness” (宗教意识) of ethnic minorities, and the advancement of the overall quality of local cadres.
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